tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-61011214054955875982024-03-13T02:55:28.084-07:00Deglobalization<p></p> <b>The current phase of deglobalization has started in 2008/9 well before Brexit and Trump were on the horizon. A decade later openness (world trade in percent of global production) is still below previous peak level with no apparent recovery </b>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.comBlogger121125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-23209928930544257372020-03-22T23:40:00.000-07:002020-03-22T23:40:00.730-07:00Deglobalization and corona<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/E5KbYxj0-O8" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-81144555424492114822020-01-15T20:44:00.001-08:002020-01-15T20:44:19.566-08:00Bastiat versus Trump: opposition to free trade rests upon errors, or, if you prefer, upon half-truths.<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3501729::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_history:of:economics:ejournal_abstractlink&partid=1193585&did=462483&eid=233442" target="new"><b><span style="border: solid #BFD0E9 1.0pt; color: #003366; mso-border-alt: solid #BFD0E9 .25pt; padding: 0cm; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">"Debunking
Protectionist Myths: Free Trade, the Developing World, and Prosperity"</span></b></a> <img alt="Free Download" border="0" id="_x0000_i1025" src="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/Images/free_pdf.gif" /> <br />
<a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/PIP_Journal.cfm?pip_jrnl=2208794::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_history:of:economics:ejournal_pipjournallink&partid=1193585&did=462483&eid=233442" target="pipInfo"><i><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Cato Institute Economic Development Bulletin, No.31, Forthcoming</span></i></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=56538::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_history:of:economics:ejournal_authorlink&partid=1193585&did=462483&eid=233442" target="new"><!-- end title plus citation --><b><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">ARVIND PANAGARIYA</span></b></a>, </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">University of Maryland
- Department of Economics, Columbia University</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">Email: <a href="mailto:panagari@econ.umd.edu"><span style="color: #003366; font-size: 9.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">panagari@econ.umd.edu</span></a></span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;">More
than 170 years ago, Frédéric Bastiat noted in his masterly work Economic
Sophisms that the “opposition to free trade rests upon errors, or, if you
prefer, upon half-truths.”1 Ever since Adam Smith successfully replaced
mercantilist orthodoxy with free trade doctrine in his celebrated book The
Wealth of Nations, free trade critics have repeatedly challenged the doctrine,
offering half-truths to bolster their case. In each instance, free trade
advocates have successfully exposed the falsehood of arguments made by critics.
Although free trade has gained increasing acceptance among policymakers over
time, challenges to it have remained omnipresent.<br />
<br />
The latest of these challenges has manifested itself in increased tariffs on
steel and aluminum in the United States and on a number of selected products in
India. At the heart of these tariff hikes has been the belief that through
targeted protection and industrial policy, governments can produce outcomes
that are superior to those that free trade and competition would produce.2
Intellectual inspiration for this belief in recent decades has come from
writings of a group of influential scholars who have interpreted the
experiences of the highly successful East Asian “tiger” economies — Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan — during the early decades following the
Second World War and of China during more recent decades as being the result of
selective protection and industrial targeting.<br />
<br />
Systematic evidence, however, demonstrates that free trade rather than
selective protection and industrial policy must be credited with propelling
these economies to miracle-level growth. Just as Bastiat observed, the case
made by free trade critics in favor of industrial policy and selective
protection is based on half-truths. Contrary to the assertions by these
critics, a logical case for infant industry protection does not exist.
Moreover, compelling empirical evidence linking trade openness causally to
higher per capita incomes is now available. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-86259445789525143502020-01-08T22:30:00.002-08:002020-01-08T22:30:56.435-08:00slowbalization Globalization has led to weaker national and international regulatory frameworks and to the emergence of new “globalist” institutional and normative frameworks. These are contested and this leads to a conflicting landscape that some call deglobalization or slowbalization (Breault & Rioux, 2019; van Bergeijk, 2019). - <a href="https://www.scirp.org/html/5-1670899_97566.htm"><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Rioux, Michèle, Christian Deblock, and Guy-Philippe Wells. "CETA, an Innovative Agreement with Many Unsettled Trajectories." </span><i style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Open Journal of Political Science</i><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> 10.01 (2019): 50.</span></a>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-68087448809081766692020-01-06T00:11:00.002-08:002020-01-06T00:11:35.153-08:00supply chain management (call for papers)Global supply chains (GSCs), which emerged from and thrived with globalization, are associated with technological changes and affected by industrial and trade policies. One lesser-known fact is that the cycle of globalization took place in waves, each has sequentially been followed by a downturn that eventually reshaped the cross-border flow of goods, capital, and people. The so-called second phase of globalization, which was empowered largely by the ICT revolution and politico-economical openness, has evidently faltered and slowed in the post-2008 financial crisis Recent development of trade tensions, such as the U.S.-China conflict, the Brexit process, Japan-South Korea trade dispute, and other business dynamics towards deglobalization are readily affecting and will continue to affect GSCs. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sean_Asian/publication/337757054_Special_Issue_Call_for_Papers-International_Journal_of_Physical_Distribution_Logistics_Management_Supply_Chain_Management_in_an_Era_of_Reglobalization/links/5de8c4d5a6fdcc2837069128/Special-Issue-Call-for-Papers-International-Journal-of-Physical-Distribution-Logistics-Management-Supply-Chain-Management-in-an-Era-of-Reglobalization.pdf">MORE</a>.peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-69972817878533463152020-01-06T00:05:00.001-08:002020-01-06T00:05:03.882-08:00riding out deglobalizationThe trade war between the US and China and the backlash against globalization has focused attention on the durability of the region’s dominant economic model, built on investment and trade in world markets. Continent-sized nations with vast domestic markets such as China, India and Indonesia are much better positioned to ride out deglobalization compared with smaller, open economies like the Asian tigers of South Korea and Taiwan. - <span style="background-color: white; font-family: "Open Sans", sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">Vasuki Shastry </span><span style="font-family: Open Sans, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px;"><i><a href="https://www.asiasentinel.com/econ-business/2020-outlook-asia-2019-lessons/">Outlook for Asia 2020: The Lessons of 2019</a>, AsiaSentinel</i></span></span>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-37916445779647726132020-01-01T06:13:00.001-08:002020-01-01T06:13:04.491-08:00the foreign policy disaster of the 2010sPotentially dangerous dynamics, like deglobalization, need to be managed, not enthusiastically embraced. A synthesis between the clash-of-systems school and the pragmatists may point toward a new consensus for a 2020s post-Trump foreign policy. - <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/2010s-were-foreign-policy-disaster/604315/">Thomas Wright in the Atlantic</a>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-70664575001504728992019-12-31T08:20:00.002-08:002020-01-01T23:15:09.468-08:00A Big History <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjflEtEJiD2JiriJGEpogB9CoQopORE2YE3YdrNbiBvzB_L0Bz5nTUBFBsPxLEPeIQfqcv_qbM-AIC8KHrbsZMe2uCWgXFb9_pE1INpMzuBZZJGt1sXjzcaKWrdPW1_9zA6D_PdQkPiyr4/s1600/big+history.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1231" data-original-width="818" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjflEtEJiD2JiriJGEpogB9CoQopORE2YE3YdrNbiBvzB_L0Bz5nTUBFBsPxLEPeIQfqcv_qbM-AIC8KHrbsZMe2uCWgXFb9_pE1INpMzuBZZJGt1sXjzcaKWrdPW1_9zA6D_PdQkPiyr4/s200/big+history.JPG" width="132" /></a></div>
This <a href="https://www.academia.edu/39400223/A_Big_History_of_Globalization_The_Emergence_of_a_Global_World_System_Springer_2019_">book</a> proposes that there have been waves of globalization<br />
and deglobalization in human history that are similar in some respects with cycles of integration and disintegration that have occurred in physical and biological evolution.peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-55466118546002903212019-12-29T01:37:00.003-08:002019-12-29T01:37:36.769-08:00desglobalizationAfter decades of increasing globalization both in trade, capital flows but even people to people movements, it seems the trend has turned towards deglobalization. This article shows some evidence of the decrease in merchandise, capital and, to a lesser extent people to people flows. In addition, zooming into trade, the article offers an account of the importance of the strategic competition between the US and China to foster the deglobalization trend further. This is true for trade but even beyond in the tech and finance space. Finally, the demise of the WTO could be one of the most relevant turning points towards deglobalization, especially as far as trade is concerned. This should<br />
bring downward pressure to growth globally <a href="http://www.cemad.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Globalization-desglobalization.pdf">- Alicia García HerreroSenior researcher of the European think tank BRUEGEL</a>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-10248208856878068882019-12-29T01:31:00.000-08:002019-12-29T01:31:04.703-08:00Global instability and social disillusion"We are arguably entering an age of increasing global instability and social disillusion, both of which may be seen as prominent hallmarks of the end of the globalization thrust and the beginning of an opposite ‘deglobalization’ era (see, especially, van Bergeijk 2019; James 2017). The symptoms of a growing instability and disillusion are variably expressed in politics, society and the economy, in so far as all these areas are experiencing a surge of nationalist and protectionist movements, fuelled by popular grievance and general distrust of elites (see, in this regard, Lagarde 2019). In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, it has in fact become common for people, especially the middle-class in developed countries, to have declining perceptions of well-being and trust in the future.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0003-2565/2019/0003-25651904068B.pdf">- Giorgio Beretta, ‘FIXING’ THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A BLUEPRINT FOR</a><br />
<a href="https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0003-2565/2019/0003-25651904068B.pdf">INDIVIDUAL TAX REFORM"</a><br />
<div>
<br /></div>
peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-34230060998263119432019-12-24T00:44:00.001-08:002019-12-24T00:44:27.841-08:00Sanctions and deglobalization<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiCPNkj7y4ZXhVwHwmJTnZDNgzyH0mtdV63gIBsUFTY28TopcWmot88QveEy7L6ocxIXcLz87Qojtjt8L303LlaZQJ6wJ0MP3VoVte1x0knSi1uDWbA85i9Jl7HRQgfmnT3Zxm9qKYaQwU/s1600/1peter1.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="1600" height="150" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiCPNkj7y4ZXhVwHwmJTnZDNgzyH0mtdV63gIBsUFTY28TopcWmot88QveEy7L6ocxIXcLz87Qojtjt8L303LlaZQJ6wJ0MP3VoVte1x0knSi1uDWbA85i9Jl7HRQgfmnT3Zxm9qKYaQwU/s200/1peter1.jpeg" width="200" /></a></div>
One of the issues that was discussed during the <a href="https://www.uni-marburg.de/de/cnms/wirtschaft/aktuelles/nachrichten/symposium-on-the-political-economy-of-sanctions-summary-presentations-and-pictures">Symposium on the Political Economy of Sanctions</a> (Marburg University, Germany, organized by Mohammad Farzanegan and Sajjad Dizaji) was whether sanctions were a symptom or a cause of deglobalization, also in view of the increased use of sanctions by the US. The increase in the frequency of sanction threats and sanction implementations is associated with the speeding up of globalization after 1990 but this is mainly a reflection of the end to the superpower conflict that enabled a greater efficcy of UN sanctions. Sanctions agains Iran and North Korea are especially linked to one of the sympthoms of deglobalization 2.0, namely the presidency of Mr Trump.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWBJPEzAXJicZhbRr2g1hnCCyHDa0ULnOj_bI5hqzHCW7zVWUh9jv2ZUn_exYR79Z9w5sN2Bf4rEy9z8iQoly3R1CnmvdclhDXfNDDg5Hji_xEC9Qv5URJI6nKa0bSXCf4_4XHinVo_3U/s1600/political+economy+of+sanctions.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="849" data-original-width="1600" height="338" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWBJPEzAXJicZhbRr2g1hnCCyHDa0ULnOj_bI5hqzHCW7zVWUh9jv2ZUn_exYR79Z9w5sN2Bf4rEy9z8iQoly3R1CnmvdclhDXfNDDg5Hji_xEC9Qv5URJI6nKa0bSXCf4_4XHinVo_3U/s640/political+economy+of+sanctions.JPG" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-91532913765047976742019-12-24T00:23:00.005-08:002019-12-24T00:23:55.403-08:00Mansoob Murshed on re-emerging interstate hostilities and deglobalizationMost wars nowadays are internal wars, which are also described as intra-state or civil wars. Yet<br />
inter-state tensions, short of militarised conflict, still persist. Many cold war rivalries have reemerged, examples include the Syrian civil war, the recent escalation of hostilities between the<br />
USA and Iran, as well as trade related hostility between the USA and China (see, van Bergeijk<br />
2019).<br />
<br />
<i><a href="https://tinbergentoday.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Tinbergen-paper-Murshed.pdf">Reformulating Jan Tinbergen’s Normative Vision on Welfare and Security</a></i>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-77024029282836105512019-12-04T11:49:00.004-08:002019-12-04T11:49:52.705-08:00Discussion of deglobalization at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSgRHiK6os0n_iufkm3FUvsgwCuuOMGJiQwHn9amIRJh5NJsZqs0Wa5CMK2a_LU4QbDkhvNMzHdD_vLfoh7hXT1_g7-zq6fgWRndiq6o0WtfMfukBbs9HRTKNbIipozav85Og6WrBcpeE/s1600/moskva+bergeijk.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="480" data-original-width="640" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSgRHiK6os0n_iufkm3FUvsgwCuuOMGJiQwHn9amIRJh5NJsZqs0Wa5CMK2a_LU4QbDkhvNMzHdD_vLfoh7hXT1_g7-zq6fgWRndiq6o0WtfMfukBbs9HRTKNbIipozav85Og6WrBcpeE/s320/moskva+bergeijk.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs School of World Economy <br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>VII Annual Conference on the Global Economy </b><br />
<b><br /></b>
Ten years have passed after the Great Recession of 2008-2009, and a growing number of economists suggest that the new financial crisis may start next year. For the last years, most of the crisis predictors expected that it would start in Asia where a critical volume of bad debts had been accumulated. Then the focus of concerns shifted to US where the financial markets show some signs of overheating. US-China trade war and uncertainty around Brexit make the new global crisis even more possible. On the other hand, as Paul Samuelson noticed decades ago, markets had predicted “nine of the last five recessions”, and economists often see threats that fail to materialize. At the section, the following issues will be discussed: - Is it possible to predict financial crises and what indicators are the best to do it? - Does the global economy demonstrate any signs of the approaching crisis? What are the regions where it may start? - What would be the major differences between this crisis and one we passed in 2008-2009?<br />
<br />
peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-50812601631668413752019-11-25T05:11:00.003-08:002019-11-25T05:11:56.511-08:00Rationality and trade wars<div style="background-color: white; font-family: trebuchet, verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-left: 15px; margin-right: 15px; margin-top: -2px;">
<a class="papertitle" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=XykZXlasDCWmVPX2CDareszCOcT1PjeupzC8iToDzUnqNheXqHHXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fpapers.cfm%3fabstract_id%3d3478775%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_abstractlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d454919%26eid%3d516281" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="background-color: #c8e3f9; border-color: rgb(191, 208, 233); border-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 0px 10px; color: #003366; font-weight: bold; margin-left: 0px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">"Trade Wars: Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition"</a> <img alt="Fee Download" src="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/14.3.468.0/themes/resources/clear1x1.gif" style="border: none;" /><br /><a class="citation" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=VYHUI9piwfGmbOopH5HjZGmyrzV4_8EoMz1_gRZi3UfqNheXqHHXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fPIP_Journal.cfm%3fpip_jrnl%3d223793%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_pipjournallink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d454919%26eid%3d516281" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-style: italic; left: 18px; padding-top: 0px; position: relative; text-decoration-line: none; top: -1px;" target="_blank">CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14079</a></div>
<div class="paperinfo" style="background-color: white; font-family: trebuchet, verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-left: 20px;">
<div style="margin-left: 15px; margin-right: 15px; margin-top: -2px;">
<a href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=3rFLAZ_X5qMLUzqMkx4oo8DvZmoWBWdlLiPVEmOzafrqNheXqHHXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fcf_dev%2fAbsByAuth.cfm%3fper_id%3d3684007%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_authorlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d454919%26eid%3d516281" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">EDDY BEKKERS</a>, <span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">World Trade Organization (WTO)</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Email: <a class="email" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=4B6uEhHr348zH6OOMbugh7JiNMhp6FApLWuZpzt4HPvqNheXqHHXCA..&URL=mailto%3aeddy.bekkers%40wto.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-size: 12px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">eddy.bekkers@wto.org</a></span><br /><a href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=TU7JDqWTb0-g2SG-lrGPQIlni-y6pXSvN7I6Xjcj417qNheXqHHXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fcf_dev%2fAbsByAuth.cfm%3fper_id%3d1598274%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_authorlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d454919%26eid%3d516281" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">JOSEPH F. FRANCOIS</a>, <span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">University of Bern - Department of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW), University of Adelaide - School of Economics</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Email: <a class="email" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=XJqRVRNwgKcDtldNg--VDmdIxeuvPvz7RJWveMk-H6DqNheXqHHXCA..&URL=mailto%3ajoseph.francois%40gmail.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-size: 12px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">joseph.francois@gmail.com</a></span><br /><a href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=m62N2U_PoBNhSCZEEXavLVWhGn0N6fDCl__E8H26Qh7qNheXqHHXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fcf_dev%2fAbsByAuth.cfm%3fper_id%3d50245%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_authorlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d454919%26eid%3d516281" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">DOUGLAS NELSON</a>, <span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Tulane University - Department of Economics</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Email: <a class="email" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=sRh0R9lxemlLMhJsQeE8GW2_rRKyS5WBVwsj0DAaoszqNheXqHHXCA..&URL=mailto%3adnelson%40tulane.edu" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-size: 12px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">dnelson@tulane.edu</a></span><br /><a href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=kLPkno13YFpVvihEJNcmnXttKKKw4blskbPvJirGPafqNheXqHHXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fcf_dev%2fAbsByAuth.cfm%3fper_id%3d466930%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_authorlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d454919%26eid%3d516281" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">HUGO ROJAS-ROMAGOSA</a>, <span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Email: <a class="email" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=hDPqsrS0Swv2oBKBPuD3b3HLpfNZdY_-XO3QK0MCYBvqNheXqHHXCA..&URL=mailto%3ah.rojas-romagosa%40cpb.nl" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-size: 12px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">h.rojas-romagosa@cpb.nl</a></span></div>
<div style="margin-left: 15px; margin-right: 15px; margin-top: -2px;">
This paper assesses the utility of economic theory of rational trade wars to predict such events or to prescribe courses of action to control their consequences. Trade wars are fundamentally political events whose causes are almost completely political and whose consequences are to a significant degree also political. Contemporary economic theory has developed during a uniquely peaceful and liberal period in world history, affecting how economists have thought about trade conflicts, leaving the profession unprepared to provide serious analysis or advice.</div>
</div>
peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-82721568358137299762019-11-25T05:05:00.000-08:002019-11-25T05:05:32.508-08:005 seats lost<div style="background-color: white; font-family: trebuchet, verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-left: 15px; margin-right: 15px; margin-top: -2px;">
<a class="papertitle" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=8bRrllaI9QK2oNkEo3WMR683YnHDSW5i3-IVOchTCyozdnbep3HXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fpapers.cfm%3fabstract_id%3d3486242%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_abstractlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d455875%26eid%3d1059558" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="background-color: #c8e3f9; border-color: rgb(191, 208, 233); border-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 0px 10px; color: #003366; font-weight: bold; margin-left: 0px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">Did Trump's Trade War Impact the 2018 Election?"</a> <img alt="Fee Download" src="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/14.3.468.0/themes/resources/clear1x1.gif" style="border: none;" /><br /><a class="citation" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=DggSNniALeJphE42e38tavL1Hk_eKVV2KllxXeBV7zozdnbep3HXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fPIP_Journal.cfm%3fpip_jrnl%3d223793%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_pipjournallink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d455875%26eid%3d1059558" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-style: italic; left: 18px; padding-top: 0px; position: relative; text-decoration-line: none; top: -1px;" target="_blank">CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14091</a></div>
<div class="paperinfo" style="background-color: white; font-family: trebuchet, verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-left: 20px;">
<div style="margin-left: 15px; margin-right: 15px; margin-top: -2px;">
<a href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=a7XH3Ryel7hG66PdaxMAADC3V5kDv1SRo06ILjEtT7Izdnbep3HXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fcf_dev%2fAbsByAuth.cfm%3fper_id%3d448339%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_authorlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d455875%26eid%3d1059558" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">EMILY J. BLANCHARD</a>, <span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Email: <a class="email" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=71R9JNeQPtReKNr7k96JqM9fonPbJNu5HZyj7uuzCngzdnbep3HXCA..&URL=mailto%3aEmily.J.Blanchard%40tuck.dartmouth.edu" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-size: 12px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">Emily.J.Blanchard@tuck.dartmouth.edu</a></span><br /><a href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=X5vKZo-THRhTS2BBHw5ccwMVEY8OAxC0FE4V2zh1LL0zdnbep3HXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fcf_dev%2fAbsByAuth.cfm%3fper_id%3d289335%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_authorlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d455875%26eid%3d1059558" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">CHAD P. BOWN</a>, <span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Peterson Institute for International Economics</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Email: <a class="email" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=BpyPdBTaoGTgJYAZkO7J8gr4FhwcU0y6rD6FRZ_n-A0zdnbep3HXCA..&URL=mailto%3acbown%40piie.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-size: 12px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">cbown@piie.com</a></span><br /><a href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=oF_pK5vTINCLx2JRQYinXLEufM6xR91H0CY2avUQ1yMzdnbep3HXCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fhq.ssrn.com%2fJournals%2fRedirectClick.cfm%3furl%3dhttps%3a%2f%2fpapers.ssrn.com%2fsol3%2fcf_dev%2fAbsByAuth.cfm%3fper_id%3d449065%3a%3adgcid%3dejournal_htmlemail_cepr%3adiscussion%3apaper%3aseries_authorlink%26partid%3d1193585%26did%3d455875%26eid%3d1059558" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">DAVIN CHOR</a>, <span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: xx-small;">Email: <a class="email" href="https://outlookweb.eur.nl/owa/redir.aspx?C=-8JJQhL8K9qX_lk_oy8KL8p4MfzmTDlVupih6LEYpEUzdnbep3HXCA..&URL=mailto%3adavinchor%40gmail.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color: #003366; font-size: 12px; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">davinchor@gmail.com</a></span></div>
<div style="margin-left: 15px; margin-right: 15px; margin-top: -2px;">
We find that Republican candidates lost support in the 2018 US congressional election in counties more exposed to trade retaliation, but saw no commensurate electoral gains from US tariff protection. The electoral losses were driven by retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products, and were only partially mitigated by the US agricultural subsidies announced in summer 2018. Republicans also fared worse in counties that had seen recent gains in health insurance coverage, affirming the importance of health care as an election issue. A counterfactual calculation suggests that the trade war (respectively, health care) can account for five (eight) of Republicans' lost House seats.</div>
</div>
peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-68232218964170133002019-08-18T22:50:00.002-07:002019-08-18T22:50:26.557-07:00Is terrorism, poverty, and refugees the dark side of globalization?<div class="page" title="Page 1">
<div class="layoutArea">
<div class="column">
<span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada, Donghyun Park, Alam Khan, and Muhammad Tahir.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 11pt;"> present a new model on the impact of terrorism on the deglobalization process. The channels are faster poverty expansion, largest flows of refugees, expansion of trade protectionism, and last but not least, the dramatic expansion of economic desgrowth. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 11pt;">This new model is entitled “The</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 11pt;">Deglobalization Global Evaluation Model (DGE-Model)</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 11pt;">”. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 11pt;">The objective of the DGE-Model is to offer policy-makers and researchers a new analytical tool to study the impact of terrorism on the deglobalization process of Muslim countries. The applicability of the DGE-Model is not limited to a specific group of Muslim countries or regions, nor is it constrained by the development stage. In short, the DGE-Model is a simple, flexible and versatile tool to study the link between terrorism and deglobalization. They apply their model to three Muslim countries, namely </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #111111; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 11pt;">Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan for </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 11pt;">1999 to 2018, a period which witnessed acceleration of deglobalization and expansion of terrorism in those three countries.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 11pt;"><br /></span>
<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mario_Ruiz_Estrada/publication/328476638_Is_Terrorism_Poverty_and_Refugees_the_Dark_Side_of_Globalization/links/5c0f4ccc299bf139c74fc0e3/Is-Terrorism-Poverty-and-Refugees-the-Dark-Side-of-Globalization.pdf"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Estrada, Mario Arturo Ruiz, et al. "Is terrorism, poverty, and refugees the dark side of globalization?." </span><i style="caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Quality & Quantity</i><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">(2019): 1-13.</span></a></div>
</div>
</div>
peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-86756766927464352242019-08-14T23:54:00.001-07:002019-08-14T23:54:33.858-07:00The costs of austerity: deglobalization<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3428368::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cepr:discussion:paper:series_abstractlink&partid=1193585&did=442677&eid=439577" target="new"><b><span style="border: solid #BFD0E9 1.0pt; color: #003366; mso-border-alt: solid #BFD0E9 .25pt; padding: 0cm; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">"Did
Austerity Cause Brexit?"</span></b></a> <img alt="Fee Download" border="0" id="_x0000_i1025" src="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/Images/fee_pdf.gif" /> <br />
<a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/PIP_Journal.cfm?pip_jrnl=223793::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cepr:discussion:paper:series_pipjournallink&partid=1193585&did=442677&eid=439577" target="pipInfo"><i><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13846</span></i></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=2679627::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cepr:discussion:paper:series_authorlink&partid=1193585&did=442677&eid=439577" target="new"><!-- end title plus citation --><b><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">THIEMO FETZER</span></b></a>, </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">University of Warwick</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">Email: <a href="mailto:t.fetzer@warwick.ac.uk"><span style="color: #003366; font-size: 9.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">t.fetzer@warwick.ac.uk</span></a></span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;">This
paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an individual
or area to the UK government's austerity-induced welfare reforms begun in 2010,
and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK Independence
Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK referendum on
European Union membership; broader individual-level measures of political
dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave. Leveraging data from
all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed, individual-level
panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could have resulted in
a Remain victory had it not been for austerity. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-58799029135050317812019-08-14T23:53:00.001-07:002019-08-14T23:53:09.871-07:00The end of hegemony<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3428370::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cepr:discussion:paper:series_abstractlink&partid=1193585&did=442677&eid=439577" target="new"><b><span style="border: solid #BFD0E9 1.0pt; color: #003366; mso-border-alt: solid #BFD0E9 .25pt; padding: 0cm; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">"Funding
the Great War and the Beginning of the End for British Hegemony"</span></b></a> <img alt="Fee Download" border="0" id="_x0000_i1025" src="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/Images/fee_pdf.gif" /> <br />
<a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/PIP_Journal.cfm?pip_jrnl=223793::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cepr:discussion:paper:series_pipjournallink&partid=1193585&did=442677&eid=439577" target="pipInfo"><i><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13848</span></i></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=3566695::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cepr:discussion:paper:series_authorlink&partid=1193585&did=442677&eid=439577" target="new"><!-- end title plus citation --><b><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">MARTIN ELLISON</span></b></a>, </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">University of Oxford</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
<a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=22029::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cepr:discussion:paper:series_authorlink&partid=1193585&did=442677&eid=439577" target="new"><b><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">THOMAS J. SARGENT</span></b></a>, </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">New York University (NYU) - Department of
Economics, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER)</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">Email: <a href="mailto:thomas.sargent@nyu.edu"><span style="color: #003366; font-size: 9.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">thomas.sargent@nyu.edu</span></a></span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
<a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=54260::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cepr:discussion:paper:series_authorlink&partid=1193585&did=442677&eid=439577" target="new"><b><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">ANDREW SCOTT</span></b></a>, </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">London Business School - Department of
Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">Email: <a href="mailto:ascott@london.edu"><span style="color: #003366; font-size: 9.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">ascott@london.edu</span></a></span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;">Britain
was the richest country in the world at the outbreak of the Great War,
benefitting from all the resources of an industrialised country and a large
empire. Funding the war contributed to the beginning of the end for British
hegemony. Financiers in London extracted a high price for lending their money
to the government to pay for the supplies and munitions needed to win the war.
The US extracted a similarly high price for lending to Britain during the war.
Russia never paid its war debts to Britain; France, Italy and Belgium got off
lightly; but for a long time the US insisted on Britain repaying in full. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-28380244230393712022019-08-09T04:52:00.003-07:002019-08-09T04:52:51.658-07:00Zbyněk Fiala on Deglobalization 2.0However, the fear of exaggerated globalization is also expressed by serious economic science. There is no unity, but there is a stream that speaks of the recurrence and withdrawal of globalization. One such deglobalization occurred after the Great Depression in the 1930s and the other began after the Great Recession, as Americans call the financial crisis after 2008. Peter van Bergeijk writes about it in Deglobalization 2.0, Trade and Openess . The book has just been published by Elgar Publishing and is also available in electronic form, so I could read at least a summary of the first chapter. ( HERE )<br />
<br />
Basically, today's processes of 'deglobalization', ascribed to Trump and Brexit, were much earlier. So we see symptoms, not causes. Like all economic processes, globalization has not only revenues but also costs. In the beginning, revenues grow faster than costs. Greater openness of the economy opens up huge profits that can be partly offered to the population in the form of boom and cheaper goods. Economic growth is based on increasing productivity. But production is increasingly moving overseas. This creates social costs. There is pressure on the domestic industry. Bottom races are starting to hinder wage growth. The huge concentration of the economy destroys the weaker players, paying for the import boxes at home. Social inequalities are on the rise, and they have already overcome the situation before the Great Depression. Society is entering a stage where it can only improve the social situation by reducing its involvement in globalization. This is what Trump has, although he has never read this book, and perhaps no other book.<br />
<br />
In addition, we are witnessing a power struggle to preserve American hegemony in the world. This also accompanies Trump from the start, but it is not his struggle, he must not give the impression that he is his weak link. This is the struggle of the "deep state," the neocons, who are not distracted by the distinction between Republicans and Democrats. It has become American custom to run presidents behind the scenes. Barack Obama managed, he did not have them. But Trump is a nut. He's trying to cheat on those matches. He always comes up with the most radical thesis that takes the breath away, and when it escalates, he shifts his attention to something else.<br />
<br />
President Obama spoke sensibly and tried to define peace policies, but he eventually dunked in the new devastating wars in Syria and Libya. Trump, so far, no new war has occurred, on the contrary, retreats in Syria and in Afghanistan negotiates with the Taliban. Even the Korean crisis did not cause shots. Negotiations with China, the next round is likely to take place at the end of June at the Japanese G-20 meeting. Let me allow the blind man's prophecy that Trump will not allow the situation to go to war. But it can use tensions, for example, to make greater Chinese and South Korean concessions to address the North Korean crisis.<br />
<br />
But beware, Europe is not out. The trade war that is going on with China is also ready for Europe, but has been postponed for six months. One of the cards Trump tries to trump at home is also the ability to squeeze substantially higher purchases of American weapons from Europeans. The EU is defending itself, even if it doesn't talk much about it. One measure is to decide that large arms purchases will be discussed in a special committee to draw attention to European alternative suppliers. Armament spending would rise as Trump demands, but not for the purpose desired in his eyes. It won't go unanswered either.<br />
<br />
None of the small European states is able to cope with unilateral American demands, but we can only criticize them on the notice board. A sensible European unification gives a better chance. Is it achievable? It is now decided.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/nazory-a-petice/Zbynek-Fiala-O-co-jde-kolem-Huawei-582595">Published on Vasevec.cz </a>.peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-90011031670654293842019-08-07T22:32:00.004-07:002019-08-07T22:32:59.439-07:00it's the 1910s<span style="color: #1a1a1a; font-family: Spectral, serif; font-size: 19px;">It has become fashionable to compare the current rise of populism to the political developments of the 1930s and the aftermath of the Great Depression. In my view, however, investors can learn more from a comparison with the Gilded Age of the late 19thcentury and the years leading up to World War I. </span><br />
<span style="color: #1a1a1a; font-family: Spectral, serif; font-size: 19px;"><br /></span>
<span style="color: #1a1a1a; font-family: Spectral, serif;"><span style="font-size: 19px;"><a href="https://klementoninvesting.substack.com/p/echoes-of-the-gilded-age-part-1-economics">https://klementoninvesting.substack.com/p/echoes-of-the-gilded-age-part-1-economics</a></span></span>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-42326348714374137412019-08-07T22:27:00.001-07:002019-08-07T22:27:10.105-07:00Us vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism, by Ian Bremmer<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyh8A86p6y65za1Yx7uZRRNR23MQBkqDnxN4E-UCVgmYUdSZHCYv7_G6oyZ0x4SqmqOZuUdKIW3G6VokGYVEzRvhx_96HVgmBWLDeg0e5cGSkMwnjaYqy0cIp7cFyej2j51DKxjkwSRJA/s1600/Knipsel.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1009" data-original-width="688" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyh8A86p6y65za1Yx7uZRRNR23MQBkqDnxN4E-UCVgmYUdSZHCYv7_G6oyZ0x4SqmqOZuUdKIW3G6VokGYVEzRvhx_96HVgmBWLDeg0e5cGSkMwnjaYqy0cIp7cFyej2j51DKxjkwSRJA/s200/Knipsel.JPG" width="136" /></a></div>
For the past 40 years, globalization has promised to break down international barriers and bring shared prosperity to the developed and developing worlds alike. The so-called end of history held Western-style liberalism triumphant and heralded a new era of international cooperation. Fast forward to 2019 and the consensus seems to be rapidly unwinding. Rising populism in Europe and America, increasing geopolitical tension, and a new love of walls — both literal and figurative — threatens to usher in a new period of ‘deglobalization’. Political scientist (and head of risk consultancy at the Eurasia Group) Ian Bremmer’s latest book tries to answer the question: why is globalism failing?<br />
<br />
Why should you read it? As the scale of the global challenges facing us becomes increasingly evident, the much-maligned “Davos Elite” seems to be doubling down on Business as Usual. It is refreshing then to read a sincere critique of the problems created by globalization from an unapologetic globalist. Although it does tend to retread the same ground, and some of the analysis could be more thorough, Us vs Them avoids the usual talking points in favor of a deeper discussion on the fundamental issues driving the backlash against globalization.<br />
<br />
Source: <a href="https://enterprise.press/issues/2019/08/02/enterprise-summer-reading-list/#the-econ-corner">https://enterprise.press/issues/2019/08/02/enterprise-summer-reading-list/#the-econ-corner</a><br />
<br />peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-27972946596664222712019-08-07T22:19:00.001-07:002019-08-07T22:19:46.304-07:00百度翻译|百度词典<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi40bQ6421-Ujh4luydGKwgX3C-yVZda5Os6hOtjPZ_1nSDkgQTQURng5F0baX9K9i24Boj-N78_h03uXs1NBa79kDvbCwBx6gJkWWFSfoIYZz8C2LHJLSRx2Ja7OBAtPEkGoAyZT1pMeQ/s1600/Knipsel.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1193" data-original-width="1600" height="238" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi40bQ6421-Ujh4luydGKwgX3C-yVZda5Os6hOtjPZ_1nSDkgQTQURng5F0baX9K9i24Boj-N78_h03uXs1NBa79kDvbCwBx6gJkWWFSfoIYZz8C2LHJLSRx2Ja7OBAtPEkGoAyZT1pMeQ/s320/Knipsel.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-73457990938126998842019-08-07T22:07:00.001-07:002019-08-07T22:07:24.130-07:00Lessons from the trade blocks and trade wars<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3422247::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cesifo:working:paper:series_abstractlink&partid=1193585&did=441643&eid=768504" target="new"><b><span style="border: solid #BFD0E9 1.0pt; color: #003366; mso-border-alt: solid #BFD0E9 .25pt; padding: 0cm; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">"Trade
Blocs and Trade Wars During the Interwar Period"</span></b></a> <img alt="Free Download" border="0" id="_x0000_i1025" src="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/Images/free_pdf.gif" /> <br />
<a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/PIP_Journal.cfm?pip_jrnl=254971::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cesifo:working:paper:series_pipjournallink&partid=1193585&did=441643&eid=768504" target="pipInfo"><i><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">CESifo Working Paper No. 7665</span></i></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=383168::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cesifo:working:paper:series_authorlink&partid=1193585&did=441643&eid=768504" target="new"><!-- end title plus citation --><b><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">DAVID S. JACKS</span></b></a>, </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">Simon Fraser
University (SFU) - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER)</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">Email: <a href="mailto:djacks@sfu.ca"><span style="color: #003366; font-size: 9.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">djacks@sfu.ca</span></a></span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
<a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/Journals/RedirectClick.cfm?url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=709411::dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_cesifo:working:paper:series_authorlink&partid=1193585&did=441643&eid=768504" target="new"><b><span style="color: #003366; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">DENNIS NOVY</span></b></a>, </span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">University of Warwick - Department of
Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP), CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><br />
</span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 7.5pt;">Email: <a href="mailto:d.novy@warwick.ac.uk"><span style="color: #003366; font-size: 9.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">d.novy@warwick.ac.uk</span></a></span><span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 11.25pt; margin-right: 11.25pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto;">
<span style="font-family: "Verdana",sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt;">What
precisely were the causes and consequences of the trade wars in the 1930s? Were
there perhaps deeper forces at work in reorienting global trade prior to the
outbreak of World War II? And what lessons may this particular historical
episode provide for the present day? To answer these questions, we distinguish
between long-run secular trends in the period from 1920 to 1939 related to the
formation of trade blocs (in particular, the British Commonwealth) and
short-run disruptions associated with the trade wars of the 1930s (in
particular, large and widespread declines in bilateral trade, the narrowing of
trade imbalances, and sharp drops in average traded distances). We argue that
the trade wars mainly served to intensify pre-existing efforts towards the formation
of trade blocs which dated from at least 1920. More speculatively, we argue
that the trade wars of the present day may serve a similar purpose as those in
the 1930s, that is, the intensification of China- and US-centric trade blocs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-35142304842971896862019-07-28T21:41:00.000-07:002019-07-28T21:41:03.321-07:00Lucas Chancel on inequality and deglbalizationWe already have phenomena like Donald Trump, brexit and populists gaining ground. Will "deglobalization" become more pronounced in this wave?<br />
<br />
One of the problems is that the promises of globalization largely fail. It should raise the standard of living in low-income countries, and this happened.<br />
<br />
But it should also improve the lives of middle class and working people in rich countries, and this has not happened.<br />
<br />
One way to understand the rejection of multilateralism is the very failure of multilateralism.<br />
<br />
But one way to try to make it successful is to address the critical question you posed, the flight of capital. It is necessary to organize globalization and to know with more transparency where wealth is and how it moves from one country to another.<br />
<br />
This means, for example, that we can not continue to negotiate with tax havens that do not respect the basic rules of transparency. Because countries and governments lose in this game. This justifies the imposition of limits.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://temas.folha.uol.com.br/global-inequality/europe/globalization-has-failed-for-many-and-the-reaction-may-be-violent.shtml">https://temas.folha.uol.com.br/global-inequality/europe/globalization-has-failed-for-many-and-the-reaction-may-be-violent.shtml</a>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-85241763613912162192019-07-28T21:34:00.002-07:002019-07-28T21:34:33.855-07:00Deglobalization revisited: Seven macro directionsJohn Butler: There will still be economic cycles, but this structural theme of deglobalisation is changing the nature of those cycles and the underlying trends they oscillate around. This is a clear frame break from the past and will be played out over multiple years. While we will likely see an ebb and flow, driven by the broader dynamics of the economic cycle, the path is clear and concerning for economic growth. <a href="https://www.wellington.com/en/insights/deglobalization-revisited-seven-macro-directions/?_c=uhjqe">more</a>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6101121405495587598.post-74074683423389211612019-07-28T21:31:00.000-07:002019-07-28T21:31:32.918-07:00Investing in the age of deglobalization<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #666666; font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14px;">Rana Foroohar: </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #666666; font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14px;">The wisdom of relying on the equity of US multinationals is now suspect</span><br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8f67815e-aa07-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04">more</a>peter van bergeijkhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12443284253584365764noreply@blogger.com0