The current phase of deglobalization has started in 2008/9 well before Brexit and Trump were on the horizon. A decade later openness (world trade in percent of global production) is still below previous peak level with no apparent recovery
In a world roiled by populist sentiments and anti-immigrant tendencies, the world’s well-trodden migration corridors, which follow remittance corridors one to one, are under strain. It would seem fitting (if tragic), that a world hellbent on retrenchment and deglobalization, is not only raising barriers to entry to the more than 260 million economic migrants around the world, it is also squeezing remittance flows with costly transfer fees. Read more on risk cooperative
Remittances are interesting because these flows are based on decisions by individuals and households, rather than firms or governments. It is a good additional indicator since it is motivated by considerations other than FDI or official flows including development aid. Remittances did not suffer a major collapse but clearly a slow down since the start of the Great Depression is also visible here. So also for this component of economic globalization we see a structural break. Read more in chapter 2
The last three decades have seen an acceleration of the interconnectedness of the global economy on a number of levels: economic, productive, financial, social, and cultural. Some referred to it as a turbocharged globalisation (Friedman, The Lexus and the olive tree: Understanding globalization. New York: Random House, 2000) since, not only had it been multi-faceted, but it had moved faster than any time before. The 2008 financial crisis has somewhat pushed to the fore the undesirable implications of such global linkages, especially in advanced economies where de-industrialisation, joblessness, and imbalances in the national and regional economies were reducing the responsiveness and resilience of economic systems to face external shocks. This led to the emergence of bottom-up resentment that has shaken political establishments in both the United States and Europe; consider the election of Trump in the United States, the emergence of populist parties in Europe and Brexit. A dislike fo…
A decade after the first crisis of 21st century capitalism, Europe has passed the nadir of the aftershocks unleashed by the 2008 global downturn. It is time to count blessings: a rerun of the Great Depression has been avoided and growth returned to the besieged continent. Whether the upswing will continue in 2019 is doubtful as dark clouds hover on the horizon. The spectre of deglobalization looming over trade tensions between the United States (US) and China, the uncertain fallout from Brexit, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian backsliding on the rule of law, and the rise of populism across the continent confront the European Union (EU) with an existential crisis.