"Debunking Protectionist Myths: Free Trade, the Developing World, and Prosperity"   Cato Institute Economic Development Bulletin, No.31, Forthcoming ARVIND PANAGARIYA , University of Maryland - Department of Economics, Columbia University Email: panagari@econ.umd.edu More than 170 years ago, Frédéric Bastiat noted in his masterly work Economic Sophisms that the “opposition to free trade rests upon errors, or, if you prefer, upon half-truths.”1 Ever since Adam Smith successfully replaced mercantilist orthodoxy with free trade doctrine in his celebrated book The Wealth of Nations, free trade critics have repeatedly challenged the doctrine, offering half-truths to bolster their case. In each instance, free trade advocates have successfully exposed the falsehood of arguments made by critics. Although free trade has gained increasing acceptance among policymakers over time, challenges to it have remained omnipresent. The latest of these challenges has manifested itself ...

Globalization has led to weaker national and international regulatory frameworks and to the emergence of new “globalist” institutional and normative frameworks. These are contested and this leads to a conflicting landscape that some call deglobalization or slowbalization (Breault & Rioux, 2019; van Bergeijk, 2019). -  Rioux, Michèle, Christian Deblock, and Guy-Philippe Wells. "CETA, an Innovative Agreement with Many Unsettled Trajectories."  Open Journal of Political Science  10.01 (2019): 50.

Global supply chains (GSCs), which emerged from and thrived with globalization, are associated with technological changes and affected by industrial and trade policies. One lesser-known fact is that the cycle of globalization took place in waves, each has sequentially been followed by a downturn that eventually reshaped the cross-border flow of goods, capital, and people. The so-called second phase of globalization, which was empowered largely by the ICT revolution and politico-economical openness, has evidently faltered and slowed in the post-2008 financial crisis  Recent development of trade tensions, such as the U.S.-China conflict, the Brexit process, Japan-South Korea trade dispute, and other business dynamics towards deglobalization are readily affecting and will continue to affect GSCs. MORE .

The trade war between the US and China and the backlash against globalization has focused attention on the durability of the region’s dominant economic model, built on investment and trade in world markets. Continent-sized nations with vast domestic markets such as China, India and Indonesia are much better positioned to ride out deglobalization compared with smaller, open economies like the Asian tigers of South Korea and Taiwan. -  Vasuki Shastry  Outlook for Asia 2020: The Lessons of 2019 , AsiaSentinel

Potentially dangerous dynamics, like deglobalization, need to be managed, not enthusiastically embraced. A synthesis between the clash-of-systems school and the pragmatists may point toward a new consensus for a 2020s post-Trump foreign policy. - Thomas Wright in the Atlantic

This book proposes that there have been waves of globalization and deglobalization in human history that are similar in some respects with cycles of integration and disintegration that have occurred in physical and biological evolution.

After decades of increasing globalization both in trade, capital flows but even people to people movements, it seems the trend has turned towards deglobalization. This article shows some evidence of the decrease in merchandise, capital and, to a lesser extent people to people flows. In addition, zooming into trade, the article offers an account of the importance of the strategic competition between the US and China to foster the deglobalization trend further. This is true for trade but even beyond in the tech and finance space. Finally, the demise of the WTO could be one of the most relevant turning points towards deglobalization, especially as far as trade is concerned. This should bring downward pressure to growth globally - Alicia García HerreroSenior researcher of the European think tank BRUEGEL

"We are arguably entering an age of increasing global instability and social disillusion, both of which may be seen as prominent hallmarks of the end of the globalization thrust and the beginning of an opposite ‘deglobalization’ era (see, especially, van Bergeijk 2019; James 2017). The symptoms of a growing instability and disillusion are variably expressed in politics, society and the economy, in so far as all these areas are experiencing a surge of nationalist and protectionist movements, fuelled by popular grievance and general distrust of elites (see, in this regard, Lagarde 2019). In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, it has in fact become common for people, especially the middle-class in developed countries, to have declining perceptions of well-being and trust in the future. - Giorgio Beretta, ‘FIXING’ THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A BLUEPRINT FOR INDIVIDUAL TAX REFORM"

One of the issues that was discussed during the  Symposium on the Political Economy of Sanctions (Marburg University, Germany, organized by Mohammad Farzanegan and Sajjad Dizaji) was whether sanctions were a symptom or a cause of deglobalization, also in view of the increased use of sanctions by the US. The increase in the frequency of sanction threats and sanction implementations is associated with the speeding up of globalization after 1990 but this is mainly a reflection of the end to the superpower conflict that enabled a greater efficcy of UN sanctions. Sanctions agains Iran and North Korea are especially linked to one of the sympthoms of deglobalization 2.0, namely the presidency of Mr Trump.

Most wars nowadays are internal wars, which are also described as intra-state or civil wars. Yet inter-state tensions, short of militarised conflict, still persist. Many cold war rivalries have reemerged, examples include the Syrian civil war, the recent escalation of hostilities between the USA and Iran, as well as trade related hostility between the USA and China (see, van Bergeijk 2019). Reformulating Jan Tinbergen’s Normative Vision on Welfare and Security

Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs School of World Economy  VII Annual Conference on the Global Economy  Ten years have passed after the Great Recession of 2008-2009, and a growing number of economists suggest that the new financial crisis may start next year. For the last years, most of the crisis predictors expected that it would start in Asia where a critical volume of bad debts had been accumulated. Then the focus of concerns shifted to US where the financial markets show some signs of overheating. US-China trade war and uncertainty around Brexit make the new global crisis even more possible. On the other hand, as Paul Samuelson noticed decades ago, markets had predicted “nine of the last five recessions”, and economists often see threats that fail to materialize. At the section, the following issues will be discussed: - Is it possible to predict financial crises and what indicators are the best to do it? - Does the global economy demonstrate any sign...

"Trade Wars: Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition"   CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14079 EDDY BEKKERS ,  World Trade Organization (WTO) Email:  eddy.bekkers@wto.org JOSEPH F. FRANCOIS ,  University of Bern - Department of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW), University of Adelaide - School of Economics Email:  joseph.francois@gmail.com DOUGLAS NELSON ,  Tulane University - Department of Economics Email:  dnelson@tulane.edu HUGO ROJAS-ROMAGOSA ,  CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis Email:  h.rojas-romagosa@cpb.nl This paper assesses the utility of economic theory of rational trade wars to predict such events or to prescribe courses of action to control their consequences. Trade wars are fundamentally political events whose causes are almost completely political and whose consequences are to a significant degree also political. Contemporary econom...

Did Trump's Trade War Impact the 2018 Election?"   CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14091 EMILY J. BLANCHARD ,  Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business Email:  Emily.J.Blanchard@tuck.dartmouth.edu CHAD P. BOWN ,  Peterson Institute for International Economics Email:  cbown@piie.com DAVIN CHOR ,  Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics Email:  davinchor@gmail.com We find that Republican candidates lost support in the 2018 US congressional election in counties more exposed to trade retaliation, but saw no commensurate electoral gains from US tariff protection. The electoral losses were driven by retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products, and were only partially mitigated by the US agricultural subsidies announced in summer 2018. Republicans also fared worse in counties that had seen recent gains in health insurance coverage, affirming the importance of health care as an electio...

Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada, Donghyun Park, Alam Khan, and Muhammad Tahir.  present a new model on the impact of terrorism on the deglobalization process. The channels are faster poverty expansion, largest flows of refugees, expansion of trade protectionism, and last but not least, the dramatic expansion of economic desgrowth.  This new model is entitled “The Deglobalization Global Evaluation Model (DGE-Model) ”.  The objective of the DGE-Model is to offer policy-makers and researchers a new analytical tool to study the impact of terrorism on the deglobalization process of Muslim countries. The applicability of the DGE-Model is not limited to a specific group of Muslim countries or regions, nor is it constrained by the development stage. In short, the DGE-Model is a simple, flexible and versatile tool to study the link between terrorism and deglobalization. They apply their model to three Muslim countries, namely  Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan for  1999 to 2018,...

"Did Austerity Cause Brexit?"   CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13846 THIEMO FETZER , University of Warwick Email: t.fetzer@warwick.ac.uk This paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an individual or area to the UK government's austerity-induced welfare reforms begun in 2010, and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK Independence Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership; broader individual-level measures of political dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave. Leveraging data from all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed, individual-level panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could have resulted in a Remain victory had it not been for austerity.

"Funding the Great War and the Beginning of the End for British Hegemony"   CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13848 MARTIN ELLISON , University of Oxford THOMAS J. SARGENT , New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Email: thomas.sargent@nyu.edu ANDREW SCOTT , London Business School - Department of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Email: ascott@london.edu Britain was the richest country in the world at the outbreak of the Great War, benefitting from all the resources of an industrialised country and a large empire. Funding the war contributed to the beginning of the end for British hegemony. Financiers in London extracted a high price for lending their money to the government to pay for the supplies and munitions needed to win the war. The US extracted a similarly high price for lending to Britain during the war. Russia never paid its war debts to Britain; Fr...

However, the fear of exaggerated globalization is also expressed by serious economic science. There is no unity, but there is a stream that speaks of the recurrence and withdrawal of globalization. One such deglobalization occurred after the Great Depression in the 1930s and the other began after the Great Recession, as Americans call the financial crisis after 2008. Peter van Bergeijk writes about it in Deglobalization 2.0, Trade and Openess . The book has just been published by Elgar Publishing and is also available in electronic form, so I could read at least a summary of the first chapter. ( HERE ) Basically, today's processes of 'deglobalization', ascribed to Trump and Brexit, were much earlier. So we see symptoms, not causes. Like all economic processes, globalization has not only revenues but also costs. In the beginning, revenues grow faster than costs. Greater openness of the economy opens up huge profits that can be partly offered to the population in the form o...

It has become fashionable to compare the current rise of populism to the political developments of the 1930s and the aftermath of the Great Depression. In my view, however, investors can learn more from a comparison with the Gilded Age of the late 19thcentury and the years leading up to World War I.  https://klementoninvesting.substack.com/p/echoes-of-the-gilded-age-part-1-economics

For the past 40 years, globalization has promised to break down international barriers and bring shared prosperity to the developed and developing worlds alike. The so-called end of history held Western-style liberalism triumphant and heralded a new era of international cooperation. Fast forward to 2019 and the consensus seems to be rapidly unwinding. Rising populism in Europe and America, increasing geopolitical tension, and a new love of walls — both literal and figurative — threatens to usher in a new period of ‘deglobalization’. Political scientist (and head of risk consultancy at the Eurasia Group) Ian Bremmer’s latest book tries to answer the question: why is globalism failing? Why should you read it? As the scale of the global challenges facing us becomes increasingly evident, the much-maligned “Davos Elite” seems to be doubling down on Business as Usual. It is refreshing then to read a sincere critique of the problems created by globalization from an unapologetic globalist....